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In a paper published this week in the International Journal of Transitional Justice, 牛牛资源’s Dr Jasna Dragovic-Soso analyses why a decade of attempts to create a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina have failed.

While several initiatives were launched between 1996 鈥� 2007, none came to fruition despite the considerable efforts of external actors.

Dr Dragovic-Soso, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, explains how the project foundered for three principal reasons: domestic political resistance, institutional rivalry between the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the Truth and Reconciliation project, and the project鈥檚 lack of legitimacy, notably among Bosnia鈥檚 victim associations.

This 鈥榟istory of failure鈥� in Bosnia holds important lessons for on-going truth-seeking attempts in the region and beyond, and highlights problems that arise in post-conflict societies when there is a high level of international involvement.

鈥淚n divided states, a national truth commission can materialise as a legitimate force for change only as part of a wider agenda pursued by leaders who genuinely embrace social and political reconstruction. External actors can support such individuals, but they cannot replace them," Dr Dragovic-Soso explains.

鈥淔ar from being a technical exercise, establishing a truth commission raises questions about legitimate authority in defining the past, the purpose of the reckoning and the thorny dilemmas of practical viability and sources of support.

鈥淚n this context, international actors are often not 鈥榚xternal鈥� but integral to the process, seeking to create preferences and determine outcomes in line with their own interests and ideas.

鈥淭heir emphasis on the state and its institutions, on promoting nation-building and an internationally brokered political compromise, as was the case in Bosnia, may not always represent the most productive way of confronting a difficult and contested past or addressing the needs of those who suffered the most.鈥�

"Confirmation of the country's deep ideological and political divisions"

Also published this week is a special open access edition of the journal , highlighting Dr Dragovic-Soso鈥檚 research on Serbia鈥檚 apology for the Srebrenica massacre.

Her work explores how Serbia鈥檚 parliamentary debate of 2010 - which led to an apology for Serbia鈥檚 role in the 1995 massacre by Bosnian Serb forces of some 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men 鈥� did not represent a turning point in Serbia鈥檚 process of confronting the past.

In , originally published in 2012, she argues that the debate and the ensuing parliamentary declaration instead confirmed the country鈥檚 deep ideological and political divisions.

It was an apology issued under pressure from the European Union, and not a result of any genuine political reckoning with the crimes of the Milo拧evi膰 era, Dr Dragovic-Soso argues.

The case is a key example of the limitations of external intervention in processes of acknowledgement and memory construction, which may produce tangible results such as the extradition of war criminals or political declarations, but do not on their own lead to meaningful engagement with a difficult past.

(Photograph taken upon Karad啪i膰's arrest in November 1984)

"Real reckoning with a difficult past cannot be orchestrated from outside"

Dr Dragovic-Soso (Department of Politics) was recently interviewed by the BBC and  following the judgment of former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karad啪i膰, and his sentencing to 40 years in prison for genocide and war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

Discussing the Tribunal鈥檚 legacy, she notes both its successes in putting on trial some of the worst war criminals of the Yugoslav wars and its simultaneous failure to promote reconciliation in the region.

Reaching more than 32,000 people via The Conversation within a fortnight, the article quickly became one of the most read and commented-on opinion pieces published on the platform by a 牛牛资源 author.

鈥淲ithout international intervention there would probably have been little justice,鈥� Dr Dragovic-Soso explains.

鈥淗owever, the actions of external actors sometimes had counterproductive effects, undermining the reformist political forces seeking genuine change in their countries. And, ultimately, real reckoning with a difficult past cannot be orchestrated from outside.

If the Karad啪i膰 judgment is to have any longer-term resonance in the region, it will need to be part of a sustained internal and introspective process in those states where the crimes were perpetrated.

鈥淭hat usually implies the presence of both genuine political commitment and a propitious socio-economic context. Unfortunately, neither of these conditions are on the horizon yet anywhere in the region.鈥�